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INTRODUCTION
The banking sector plays an important 
role in the economic development of Asian 
countries. In 1997, a full-fledged banking 
and financial crises occurred in countries of 
South Asia, including Indonesia. Many banks 
must be bailed out by their government, this 
course will resist economic growth in the 
State. Banking crises in 1997/1998 resulted 
the collapse of public confidence in the 
banking industry. It would cost more than Rp. 
500 Billion to rehabilitate the banking sector, 
equivalent to 50% of Indonesia's GDP at that 
time (Bank Indonesia 2010).
Kunt and Detragiache (1998) defines 
a crisis as a situation which is one of the 
following conditions are accomplished:
1.  Non-performing assets reached 10% of the 
total assets banking system;
2. The cost to rescue the banking system 
reached 2% of GDP;
3.  Magnitude Transfer of banks ownership 
of banks to the government; and
4.  widespread "bank-run" happened.
Currently, in the scale, pattern, and a 
different scope, we face the reality that seems 
similar to the condition of the banks in late 
1997. Past events as the retrace time, starting 
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ABSTRACT
This research aim to determine the effect of independent commissioner and institutional ownership 
to financial distress banks in Indonesia. The existence of the banking crisis occurred in 1997/1998 
resulted the collapse of public confidence in banking industry. In 2008, the scale, pattern, and 
a different scope, we face the reality that seems similar to the condition of the banks in the end 
of 1997. Financial distress experienced is not only caused by external factors stemming from 
the bank but also can be caused by internal factors. On the other hand, the financial distress in 
the banking sector can be caused by governance are not good in running the bank’s operations. 
This study used a quantitative approach. The unit of analysis is the banks in Indonesia with data 
obtained from directory of Bank Indonesia in 2008-2009. The research sampling techniques use 
saturated sampling or census. Research design use multiple logistic regression with the cross 
section. The result from this study indicated that independent commissioners and institutional 
ownership cannot prevent the financial distress in 2008 and 2009. 
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with the dry liquidity, high interest rates, and 
depreciation of Rupiah.At the same month, 
November 2008, the victim began to fall. 
Century Bank, which is the result of a merger 
of Bank CIC, Bank Danpac, and Bank Pikko, 
to be the first victim. Starting from a failure 
in clearing the transaction on November 13, 
2008, the bank liquidity who keeps 15.23 
trillion rupiah’s getting worse (Pransiska 
2008).
Financial difficulties (financial 
distress) experienced by the bank is not only 
caused by external factors but can also by 
internal factors, such  as weakness of internal 
control, non professional management. 
Internal control is a monitoring mechanism 
established by management of bank by 
ongoing basis, in order to: (Directorate of 
Research and Regulation of Banks, 2003).
1)  safeguard and secure the assets of the 
Bank;
2)  ensure the availability of more accurate 
reporting;
3) improve adherence to applicable 
regulations;
4)  reduce the financial impact / loss, deviation 
including cheating / fraud, and breach of 
aspects of prudence; and
5) improve organizational effectiveness and 
improve cost efficiency.
On the other hand, the Financial 
Distress in the banking sector can caused by 
governance  with not good in running the 
bank's operations. The Forum For Corporate 
Governance In Indonesia (FCGI) defines 
corporate governance is "a set of rules that 
govern the relationship between shareholders, 
trustees (managers) of the company, creditors, 
government, employees and the holders of 
internal and external interests relating to 
the rights and their obligations, or in other 
words a system that regulates and controls 
the company. " Besides, FCGI also explained 
the purpose of Corporate Governance is "to 
create added value for all interest parties 
(stakeholders)." In detail, the terminology of 
Corporate Governance can be used to explain 
the role and behavior of the Board of Directors, 
Board of Commissioners, trustees (managers) 
of the company and its shareholders.
The existence of independent 
commissioner has been arranged the Jakarta 
Stock Exchange JSX through the regulations 
July 1, 2000. It is argued that the companies 
listed in the Exchange must have an 
Independent Commissioner proportionally 
equal to the number of shares owned by minority 
shareholders (non controlling shareholders). 
In these regulations, the requirements 
of a minimum number of independent 
commissioner is 30% of all members of 
the Board of Commissioners. While, Bank 
Indonesia (2006)  have decided more portion 
for independent commissioner less than 50% 
of total member of commissioners.
Board of Commissioners (BOC) holds 
very important role in the company, especially 
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in the implementation of Good Corporate 
Governance. BOC is one of the element of 
corporate governance are assigned to ensure 
the implementation of corporate strategy, 
controlling the management in managing the 
company, and requires the implementation 
of accountability. The point is, the Board of 
Commissioners is a mechanism to oversee and 
provide guidance and direction to the manager 
of company. Remind that management is 
responsible to improving the efficiency and 
competitiveness of enterprises, while the 
Board of Commissioners is responsible for 
overseeing management in managing the 
company's Board of Commissioners of parties 
who are responsible for the company's success.
Other aspects that affect the successful 
implementation of good governance is the 
separation of ownership that effect to control 
and the  implementation of  management 
company that caused the manager action do 
not accordance with the owner interested. 
TheAgency costs can be minimized with 
several alternatives, for example the 
ownership of institutional investors can 
serve as a monitor agent. Moh'd et al. (1998) 
stated that the distribution of shares among 
shareholders from outside the institutional 
investors will reduce agency costs. The 
presence of institutional shareholders may 
encourage greater supervision more optimal 
for management performance.
Based on above this research aims to 
prove empirically whether the government's 
policy on good corporate governance 
includes the perspective of an independent 
commissioner and institutional ownership, 
contributes to preventing financial distress.
This research aim to determine the 
effect of an independent commissioner and 
institutional ownership of financial distress at 
the Banks in Indonesia.
Based on the background, the research 
problem is whether an independent commiss-
ioner and the institutional ownership have 
influence to financial distress Banks in Indonesia 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Research about the influence of 
the relationship between ownership, board 
structure and internal control mechanisms that 
affect the survival of the banking company 
by Simpson and Gleason (1999). The result 
is only affecting the structure of the board of 
directors of the company's survival.
The study using agency and institutional 
perspectives with the aim hypotheses test 
about board structure and performance of 
companies in Russia conducted by Judge et al 
(2003). In particular, find negative relationship 
between the duality of "informal" CEO and 
company performance.The result is important 
given Russia's 1996 federal law that prohibits 
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the CEO  also chairman of the board. Overall, 
these findings suggest that effective corporate 
governance may be crucial to the companies 
performance in Russia. 
In Taiwan has been studied by Liu 
et al (2006) about the relationship between 
the CEO of a public company and change 
of control, this research analyzes that there 
is an increasing separation of ownership and 
management in Taiwan public companies. The 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
reducing firm control of their family.
Agency problems arise because of the 
different interest between principal and agent 
can be prevented or reduced by increasing 
the oversight effectiveness of the company. 
Supervision is not only limited by the parties 
of the company, but also can be done from 
an external party to enable the monitoring 
company throught the institutional investors 
that more independent than the internal. 
Corporate ownership by institutions will 
encourage more effective oversight, because 
the institution is a professional who has ability 
to evaluate the performance of the company 
(Murhadi, 2008).
The existence of ownership by 
institutional investors are defined as investors 
from the financial sector such as securities 
companies, insurance companies, banks, 
investment companies, pension funds and other 
institutional ownership will encourage more 
optimal greater supervision for performance 
management, because the ownership of shares 
representing a sources of power that can be 
used to support the existence or otherwise of 
management.
Research on the prediction of business 
failure and bankruptcy of banks by using 
financial ratios CAMEL (CAPITAL ASSET 
MANAGEMENT LIQUIDITY) models have 
been carried out by Nasser and Aryati (2000) 
and Almilia (2005). The results by Nasser 
and Aryati show that only the ratio EATAR 
and OPM is able to predict bankruptcy in the 
Go Public Banking Sector. While Almilia 
results only CAR and BOPO that can predicts 
bankruptcy and financial distress. 
According to the dictionary of Bank 
Indonesia (BI), CAMEL is the most influential 
aspects of the bank's financial condition, 
which affects the level of bank health; 
CAMEL is a measure of the object of bank 
examinations conducted by banks supervisor; 
CAMEL consists of five criteria, there are: 
capital (capital), assets (assets), management, 
earnings and liquidity CAMEL ratings 
under 81 showed a weak financial condition 
indicated by the bank's balance sheet, as no 
current loan ratio to total assets increased; if 
it is not resolved, the problem may interfere 
with bank survive; bank listed on the problem 
banks and considered to be inspected more 
frequently by bank supervisors in comparison 
with the bank that is not problematic; banks 
with CAMEL ratings above 81 is a bank 
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with strong earnings and little current assets; 
CAMEL ratings  never informed widely 
(http://www.bi.go.id). Assessment of the 
health system of commercial banks regulated 
by Bank Indonesia with Regulation Number: 
6/10/PBI/2004 about the Rating System for 
Commercial Banks. and Circular Letter No. 
6/23/DPNP about the Rating System for 
Commercial Banks.
RESEARCH METHODS
This study used a quantitative approach.
Hypothesis
The hypothesis in this study based on 
research and reasons of reference:
Ho: The existence of an independent 
commissioner and institutional 
ownership can not prevent the financial 
distress occurrence at Banks in 
Indonesia.
H1: The existence of an independent 
commissioner and institutional 
ownership will streamline the 
management control function which can 
prevent the financial distress occurrence 
at the Banks in Indonesia.
Variable Identifications
This study uses two (2) independent 
variables, here are: an independent commissio-
ner and institutional ownership, and one (1) 
the dependent variable is financial distress. 
The control variable are total branch office 
and bank’s size. 
Conceptual Framework
Refer to the research hypothesis, it 
can be drawn the conceptual framework as 
follows:
Figure 1 Conceptual Framework
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Operational Variables Definition
Independent Commissioner is the 
commissioner from outside entity or public 
company, does not have stock either directly 
or indirectly to the issuer or public company, 
has no affiliation with the issuer or public 
company, the commissioner, or the issuer's 
major shareholders or the public company, and 
do not have a business relationship directly 
or indirectly related to the business activities 
of the issuer or public company. Independent 
commissioners in this research is calculated 
by determining the percentage (%) of the total 
number of independent commissioner at the 
commissioner's bank annual report in 2008. 
Institutional ownership is the 
ownership of shares in a company which is 
majority owned by the institutions (insurance 
companies, banks, investment companies, 
asset management and other institutional 
ownership). Institutional ownership in this 
study uses the percentage of institutional share 
ownership with ownership of more than 5% of 
that scan be een in the Bank's annual report for 
the year 2008 (Graves and Waddock, 1994). 
When a company is more than one institution 
that has possession of the company's stock, the 
stock ownership is measured by calculating 
the total of all shares held by all institutional 
ownership.
Financial distress is a weak financial 
condition of a bank as measured by the CAMEL 
consisting of CAR1 (Capital Adequacy Ratio 
1), CAR2 (Capital Adequacy Ratio 2), ETA, 
NPM (Net Profit Margin), OPM, ROA (Return 
on Asset), BOPO (Operational Cost compared 
with Operational Income), and LDR (Loan to 
Deposits Ratio). Banks which had CAMEL 
under 81 showed a weak financial condition, 
and given the zero score (0), while the banks 
had CAMEL above 81 given score 1. 
Total branch is a number of bank’s 
branch. Total branch input to the control 
variable because inefficiency branch bank’s 
capital allocation will be decrease financial 
performance. Bank’s size is value of total 
bank’s asset measured by Ln the asset. Bank’s 
size input to the control variable because it’s 
influenced financial performance and bank’s 
ability  during financial crisis like as Mitton’s 
opinion (cited in Leung & Horwitz 2010, 
p.471). 
Unit Analysis
This research used Banks in Indonesia 
as unit analysis.
Population
The population is banks and data 
obtained from the directory of  Bank Indonesia 
2008-2009.
Sample
Sample of this study are financial 
statements of Bank published in 2008-2009 
and all data available for this  research.
Total Sample
Based on data in the Directory of Bank 
Indonesia 2008-2009, this study use 21 banks 
at 2008 and 19 banks at 2009. 
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Sampling Technique
This sampling techniques is saturated 
sampling. Saturated sampling is the sample 
when all the members of the population is used 
as a sample. The other terms of this saturation 
is the census sampling.
Research Design
This research use multiple logistic 
regression with the cross section. Logistic 
regression was used because the dependent 
variable in this study is dummy. The multiple 
logistic regression model is as follows:(http://
www.stat.ufl.edu)
Logit [P(y=10] = α + β1X1 + … + βkXk
And the formula of probability are as 
follow:
eα + β1X1 + … + βkXk
 1 + eα + β1X1 + … + βkXk
P (y=1) = 
Thus, the multiple logistic regression 
model in this study were:
FDi = β0 + β1% K.INDP + β2 % K.INTS + 
β3J.CBG + β4Ln T.ASET+ εi
FD = Financial Distress using 
dummy variables, one (1) 
for the companies that do not 
have Financial Distress, 0 for 
a company that have Financial 
Distress. 
i =  bank 1 to 40.
β0 = intercept
% KI = Independent Commissioner 
was measured by percentage of 
independent commissioners.
β1- β4 = Slope
% KIS = Institutional Ownership is 
measured by the percentage 
of institutional ownership.
J.CBG = Total Branch.
Ln T.ASET = Bank’s size measured by Ln 
Total Asset.
Εi  = error
This study used SPSS for data analysis.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This chapter present summary 
descriptive statistic for the sample obtained 
and run with SPSS. 
Results
The first step of logistic regression is 
block 1, and the result presented below:
Table 1. Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients Block 1: Method = Enter
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 1 Step 1.022 4 .906
Block 1.022 4 .906
Model 1.022 4 .906
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Based on the table above, the model 
can be form within one step. The table show 
chi square-test = 1,022 the significance value 
0.906, it means with level of significance 
From table above, the x variable 
will explain y variable is 4,8% (0.048) and 
many others variable can be explained the 
Table 3 and table 4 presented the Chi-
square = 10,238, with sig. value is 0.249  (α = 
5%) and the result present the H0 fail rejected, 
it means the model is fit (no differences 
between preview results and prediction model 
result) of Hosmer and Lemeshow’s Goodness 
5% (α = 0.05), HO rejected and the model is 
accepted and can be continued. The model 
summary will be show at table 2.
relationship. The Nagelkerke R Square is 
common use for some research.
of Fit Test tested the zero hypothesis (H0) 
which is the empirical data is match or fit with 
the model. The statistic value of Hosmer and 
Lemeshow’s Goodness of Fit Test is 10,238 
with significant probability 0.249 that over 
0.05 and the conclusion is model accepted.
Table 2. Model Summary
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square
1 29.120(a) .025 .048
a  Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates 
changed by less than .001
Table 3. Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1 10.238 8 .249
Table 4. Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
 
 
FD = 0 FD = 1 Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected Observed
Step 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 3 3.817 1 .183 4
2 4 3.701 0 .299 4
3 4 3.649 0 .351 4
4 4 3.612 0 .388 4
5 3 3.571 1 .429 4
6 4 3.515 0 .485 4
7 4 3.444 0 .556 4
8 4 3.356 0 .644 4
9 2 3.233 2 .767 4
10 3 3.103 1 .897 4
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Table 5. Classification Table
 Observed Predicted
  FD Percentage 
Correct  0 1
Step 1 FD 0 35 0 100.0
  1 5 0 .0
 Overall Percentage   87.5
a  The cut value is .500
Table 5 showed the overall percentage 
value is  87,5 means  accuracy of prediction 
Table 6 present four predictor logistic 
model was fitted to the data to test research 
hypothesis regarding the relationship between 
the likelihood that financial distress is affect 
by independent commissioners (K.INDP), 
institutional ownership (K.INTS), number 
of branch company (J.CBG) and total assets 
(T.ASET). The result showed that
Predicted logit of (Financial Distress) = 1.914 
+ (-0.008)*K.INDP + (0.012)*K.INTS + 
(0.000)*J.CBG + (-0.282)*T.ASET.
The model means all of X variable are 
not affect to Y variable because has a  sig >5% 
(with α = 5%).
Discussion
Independent and institutional owner-
ship are governance mechanisms did not 
affect the bank's financial performance 
during the financial crisis, this is consistent 
with the review of the literature on corporate 
governance issues in the Asia-company by 
Claessens and Fan (2002) using the period 
of financial crisis Asia 1997-1998 indicates 
that the mechanism of conventional corporate 
governance (takeover and the board of 
commissioners) are not strong enough to 
alleviate the agency problem, it is caused by 
lack of transparency, institutional systems and 
property rights in developing countries. 
model or accuracy of classification is 87,5%.
Table 6. Variables in the Equation
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Step 
1(a)
 
 
 
 
K.INDP -.008 .029 .078 1 .780 .992
K.INTS .012 .022 .298 1 .585 1.012
J.CBG .000 .027 .000 1 .987 1.000
T.ASET -.282 .573 .243 1 .622 .754
Constant
1.914 8.324 .053 1 .818 6.781
a  Variable(s) entered on step 1: K.INDP, K.INTS, J.CBG, T.ASET.
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The size and the level of independence 
of the board not affect the company's financial 
performance, the sample in this study have an 
average share of independent commissioners at 
61.19%, above the prevailing Bank Indonesia 
on the number of independent commissioners 
by at least 50% (Bank Indonesia 2006). The 
higher share of independent commissioners 
do not guarantee better financial performance 
of a bank or no influence on performance. 
Research by Andres and Vallelado (2008) 
tested the hypothesis of a dual role as the 
board of directors of Corporate Governance 
mechanisms in international commercial 
banks found that an inverted U-shaped 
relationship exists between bank performance 
and the size of the Board, and the proportion of 
non-executive directors and performance. The 
results indicate that board composition and 
size associated with the ability of directors to 
monitor and advise management, and the board 
is larger and less independent may prove more 
efficient in monitoring and providing advice, 
and create more value for the company. It can 
be concluded that the addition of independent 
commissioners serving on a certain percentage 
will actually worsen the bank's financial 
performance.
Other factors associated with the 
ownership of institutional governance, the 
study was not consistent with the research 
done by Murhadi (2008) who found that a 
professional institution that is able to evaluate 
the performance of the company so that it can 
effectively supervise. This research samples 
have an average institutional ownership of 
82.23%, the rest is individual ownership or 
management. The number of high institutional 
ownership does not ensure the preservation 
of the financial performance of the bank at 
the time of crisis, according to research by 
Leung (2010) management ownership can be 
minimize the conflict between management 
trainee so that the value of the company shares 
will rise despite the financial crisis. These 
results support the Alignment Theory.
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
Limitations of this study is the value 
calculated by the researchers CAMEL based 
on Peraturan Bank Indonesia Nomor: 6/10/
PBI/2004 tentang Sistem Penilaian Tingkat 
Kesehatan Bank Umum. dan Surat Edaran 
No. 6/23/DPNP perihal Sistem Penilaian 
Tingkat Kesehatan Bank Umum, as data on 
CAMEL inaccessible by reason of such data 
confidential.
The results of this research indicate that 
the independent and institutional ownership 
is not associated with the bank's financial 
distress experienced during the global 
financial crisis in 2008. There is no assurance 
that the independent commissioner percentage 
exceeds the percentage set by Bank Indonesia 
to maintain the Bank's performance remains 
good, as well as the portion of institutional 
ownership.
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Future research can use qualitative 
approaches to find the cause of why the 
perspective of independent and institutional 
ownership in corporate governance is not 
effective in maintaining the bank's financial 
performance during the financial crisis.
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